Long Finance NEWS

Long Finance NEWS
Created:
Friday, 25 February 2011
Group Admins:
Keep up with the latest Long Finance news, events and publications; join in with discussion topics; and connect with other Long Finance members.
Friday, 26 April 2013 by Chiara von Gunten

The financial crisis revealed that improved regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and markets, together with enhanced market transparency would be necessary to limit excessive and opaque risk-taking through OTC derivatives and to reduce the systemic risk posed by OTC derivatives transactions, markets and practices.


In 2009, G20 countries committed to changing the rules for OTC derivatives markets in order to strengthen their security and transparency. In particular they agreed to increased standardisation of derivatives, mandatory central clearing for standardised derivatives, increased collateral requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives, required registration of all transactions with trade repositories (TRs), and the implementation of a unique international identification scheme (legal entity identifier - LEI). Such commitments require both national and international regulatory developments. In April 2012, the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure were published by CPSS and IOSCO in an effort to update and broaden former standards applicable including the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in Europe.


This month, a new edition of the Financial Stability Review “OTC Derivatives: New Rules, New Actors, New Progress” was published by Banque de France. It brings together articles from experts in the sector to review progress made so far in terms of regulatory developments for OTC derivatives and markets, and to lay out remaining issues and future challenges that need to be addressed in order to achieve an international regulatory framework that is comprehensive, adequate and consistent.


Central clearing is deemed to improve liquidity and reduce risk in the OTC derivatives market. Central counterparties (CCPs) can indeed insure against counterparty risk through mutualisation, enable implementation of adequate margin requirements, save on collateral through greater netting efficiency and promote transparency in the market. As higher risk becomes concentrated through CCPs, CCPs must be properly governed, supervised, their competitive environment should be carefully monitored and their potential failure must be organised in order to avoid market turmoil. Therefore, clear principles applying in the event of recovery and/or liquidation of such market infrastructures need to be defined.


Central TRs and the implementation of unique LEI contribute to increasing transparency by improving the quality and consistency of data. This can then be used to facilitate the calculation of overall exposures across financial institutions and to allow a better understanding of the interdependence between financial players. It is argued however that transparency should be extended to include secured and unsecured interbank lending which are the underlying benchmarks for interest rate derivatives, also the most common class of OTC instruments. Moreover, while progress has been made to standardise the identification of entities in a universally acceptable manner through the LEI, the more complex question of the standardisation of the depiction of financial products, instruments, contracts across markets and jurisdictions remains an important challenge for policy-makers to address.


The treatment of non-centrally cleared derivatives also needs to be clarified. The G20 reform requires stricter margin and higher collateral requirements for such derivatives. This risks giving rise to direct or indirect costs, which would not necessarily reflect the risks incurred for market participants and the public. Such collateral requirements may also be pro-cyclical and exacerbate, instead of alleviate, financial market stress. Finally, and in the context of increasing demand for high quality collateral assets following the financial crisis, increasing collateral use is boosting the share of encumbered assets on banks’ balance sheets. Collateral use may therefore add to the complexity, opacity and interconnectedness between financial market participants.


Finally, regulatory developments on OTC derivatives and markets require an international framework but also demand updating and adapting national regulation in a way that results consistent across jurisdictions. Moreover, coordination is key to assess the appropriateness and the interactions of different regulations that are developed and being implemented concomitantly (e.g. Basel III).

Oops says The Economist as problems mount with implementing FTT - http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576673-worries-grow-about-ill-thought-out-new-european-tax-oops
Last replied by Michael Mainelli on Saturday, 27 April 2013
Very interesting work by Sheila Dow. Reading it, for me the question that leaps out is whether economics, with its emphasis on cost-benefit evaluation assuming utility-maximising rational actors, has a future at all. She seems to suggest the fundamental assumptions are so deeply flawed that we would do better to start all over again...
Last replied by Jan-Peter Onstwedder on Sunday, 10 March 2013
Interesting approach by Marco Dion of JP Morgan on news flow analysis for trading - http://www.lqg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Dion-News-Analytics.pdf - which he presented at the Royal Instiution's 14-10 Club last night
Last replied by Michael Mainelli on Friday, 08 March 2013
Dear Aidan, I think there might be a connection with something that seems very obvious to me, as an ICT specialist, but which I have not seen discussed anywhere. This is the possibility of regulating the financial system by real-time monitoring of activity, instead of assuming that regulation involves bureaucracy and retrospective auditing. The so-called Big Data technologies to do this are in well-established use now, but there seems to be no will to apply them to this issue, despite the fact that it would be hard to find a better application for them. Regards, Trevor
Last replied by Trevor Hilder on Tuesday, 27 November 2012
Here's one example (among many) of bio-inspiration in the IT industry, which illustrates in another context some of the good points made by Jan-Peter Onstwedder and Tony Czarnecki. When ants find a food source, they return to the nest, and as they do they lay a pheromone trail that smells good to other ants. The larger the food source, the stronger the pheromone trail they lay. The pheromones evaporate over time. When an ant leaves the nest to look for food, it generally follows whatever direction smells best, but also does a little bit of random exploring away from the trail. BT and HP developed algorithms for finding resources in computer networks based on ant foraging; in place of ants there are mobile pieces of software that move from one network node to another, and in place of pheromones the software ants leave signals at the nodes that other software ants can read. An ant-foraging algorithm is inherently distributed - the different ants act independently apart from reading signals that other ants have left. Unlike a centralized algorithm, it does not in general find the optimal path to a resource, although it finds good ones. So in a static network it's not so effective as a centralized algorithm that looks for the optimum. However, real computer networks (and real landscapes that ants forage over, and real economic networks) are not static. The topology changes, the resource availability changes, nodes disappear and new nodes are added, and some of the ants malfunction or die. In experiments on real computer networks, as these changes take place, the ant-foraging algorithm adjusts gracefully and rapidly finds a new good path; whereas centralized algorithms that look for the optimum path can take a long time to adjust, or may break down entirely. The general features that help ant-foraging to be robust are (a) the system uses multiple ants, and doesn't have a single point of failure (or few points of failure); (b) when ants find useful information, they communicate it to the other ants; (c) old information times out; (d) the ants follow recommendations from other ants, but also do some exploring on their own; (e) the system isn't designed to find the optimum solution, just a good one. PS Evolutionarily Stable Strategies may be a useful analogy, but they probably won't provide the whole answer: for some games no such strategies exist. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.1997.0431 Cheers, Miranda.
Last replied by Miranda Mowbray on Wednesday, 14 November 2012
Eric Tracey provides an excellent column in Financial Director on Confidence Accounting - http://www.financialdirector.co.uk/financial-director/opinion/2219142/fd-guest-column-confident-accounting
Last replied by Michael Mainelli on Sunday, 28 October 2012
The report correctly identifies one of the critical problems of its time which was a failure of the money supply to keep pace with the expansion in the means of production. However, its analysis is flawed and its relevance to today's economic and monetary situation is tenuous. For its analysis, it uses as a normative example an industrialist whose means of production are created solely by bank credit which must be amortised and whose production must be sold into a community whose only means of purchasing is through bank credit. This is not even approximately the case, as any broad economy contains a significant quantity of non-monetised capital in the form of land, natural resources, and fully-amortised buildings, equipment and infrastructure, and also employs significant quantities of trade and government credit in addition to bank credit. Using this example to define the monetary characterics of the whole economy is clearly wrong. The monetary environment at the time of the report was a currency tied to the gold standard, commercial banks tied to a fixed reserve ratio and a privately owned and operated central bank, all features about which it quite reasonably complains as contributing to the current monetary problems. None of these features applies today in any major Western economy, although the Chinese still use the reserve ratio as a means of controlling their internal money supply. Interestingly though, the report also observes that it is impossible to get experts (by which they mean economists) to agree on anything - an observation that is equally valid today.
Last replied by Tony Thomson on Saturday, 28 July 2012
femail, 29
Last replied by mina on Tuesday, 13 March 2012
Thanks for your comments (I received one by email - hopefully the member will post it on here so you can benefit from his contribution). I was just saying to Michael that we could learn more about how to measure subjective interpretations by looking at the growing trend in SRI, particularly with regard to investment from Scandinavian countries. Indeed, NAPF even signalled its support of SRI in its 2005 Paper on CSR/SRI and now that quoted companies have to report on ESG in their business review there is a growing need to calculate the value of subjective interpretations. A CSR 'value' is attributed to companies worthy of SRI through their inclusion within CSR indices (ie FTSE 4Good series), various CSR initiatives and the application of conversion factors and a motivation to make improvements on environmental impact (Defra have various conversion tools where companies can benchmark and improve on their environmental standards by converting units of consumption into a measurement of the greenhouse gases used using conversion factors such as kWh, distance travelled by vehicles etc). A value can be assigned to such activities both objectively and subjectively. I suppose the objective measurement would be the savings/sustainability benefits and perhaps reduced risk. The subjective element may be the impression this has on the stakeholders of a company. Coming from a business perspective this subjective value could be measured by improved reputation (increased sales perhaps) and reduced cost of capital (increase in investment interest). Cause and effect permitting, the value could be fairly accurately calculated (BP springs to mind). I suppose CSR initiatives allow for some form of subjective value to be calculated to fit an economists view of value in this way by taking common value indicators such as the inclusion in an index and calculating the value that it generates. I wonder if anyone has any comments/ideas on how we can learn more about the value of subjective interpretations in other areas? Another thought: a social and economic value is generated when companies donate profits to charity. In terms of tax savings the economic value of creating social value increases when companies cross the higher rate of corporation tax threshold. It makes sense to create social value in this respect by making tax-deductible donations to charity to gain value economically by having a lower corporation tax bill.
Last replied by Sarah on Sunday, 05 February 2012
Z/Yen CommunityZ Logo This site is part of the Z/Yen CommunityZ